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Abstract
In the big data era, many organizations face the dilemma of data sharing. Regular data
sharing is often necessary for human-centered discussion and communication, especially
in medical scenarios. However, unprotected data sharing may also lead to data leakage.
Inspired by adversarial attack, we propose a method for data encryption, so that for human
beings the encrypted data look identical to the original version, but for machine learning
methods they are misleading.
To show the effectiveness of our method, we collaborate with the Beijing Tiantan
Hospital, which has a world leading neurological center. We invite 3 doctors to manually
inspect our encryption method based on real world medical images. The results show that
the encrypted images can be used for diagnosis by the doctors, but not by machine learning
methods.
Keywords: Adversarial Examples, Adversarial Attack, Healthcare, Data Sharing, Data
Encryption
1. Introduction
Data sharing is a crucial and necessary component in many human-centered activities. For
example, imagine a radiologist who wants to discuss Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
findings with her/his research collaborators. To support her/his findings in a scientific way,
she/he may need to send thousands of medical images to other experts.
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Figure 1: Our goal of data sharing: for experts the encrypted data and original data can
both be used for discussion, but for ML models the encrypted data are useless in
training.
With the advancement of deep learning, data like medical images has become a valuable
asset that is highly sought after. As a result, for many data-sensitive organizations such as
hospitals, unprotected data sharing can be very risky. One of the major concerns is that
instead of just being used for intellectual discussion, the data might be used for commercial
purposes in training machine learning models without the owner’s consent.
Our goal is to derive a technique that encrypts the image such that it is visually indif-
ferent from the original version, but for a model trained on the encrypted data, it works
poorly on the original data as illustrated in Figure 1. Doing so makes the encrypted data
as well as the model trained on the encrypted data useless for the data stealers.
We get our inspiration of encryption and content preservation from adversarial examples
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Engstrom et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018), where
the perturbations are visually imperceptible but can easily fool a network.
Such adversarial examples arise because the convolutional filters tend to emphasize local
features like textures or patterns (Brendel and Bethge, 2019), while humans are able to
focus on global structure. Local features are non-robust because they are sensitive to minor
perturbations. Following Ilyas et al. (2019), we name the local features/global structures
as non-robust/robust features, respectively.
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Figure 2: A conceptual diagram of the encryption principle. We encrypt the data by chang-
ing the non-robust features of the data.
While adversarial examples were commonly used for hacking ML systems (Athalye et al.,
2018; Evtimov et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019a,b), it turns out that we can
use it as a data encryption method by exploiting the weakness of the existing models in
handling local features. See Figure 2 for details. The goal is to encrypt these local features
with easy-to-learn and misleading information such that a trained network will easily overfit
this misleading information, making the model prone to wrong judgments on the original
images.
The security of our method relies on the hardness of solving the adversarial example
problem. In other words, our encryption method fails if there are models that are trained in
adversarial domain but work indifferently in non-adversarial domain (or vice versa), or there
are methods for projecting the adversarially perturbed data into the natural data manifold.
However, there had been many explorations in both directions (Meng and Chen, 2017; Song
et al., 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018a; Santhanam and Grnarova, 2018; Xie et al., 2019),
but so far no satisfactory solution has been found.
To show the effectiveness of our method, we first conduct experiments on CIFAR-10.
On top of ensuring the encryption works, we also make sure that the image before and after
encryption is of negligible difference. To further investigate whether the encryption will
destroy minute local information, we collaborate with Beijing Tiantan Hospital, which has
the largest neurological center in China. We conduct the experiment on 5, 314 MRI images,
and also invite 3 doctors to manually evaluate the difference between the original and the
encrypted images. Our results show that our encryption does not affect the diagnosis of the
doctors, but significantly lower the performance of machine learning methods.
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2. Preliminaries
We consider the standard classification setting. Let X ⊆ Rn be the input domain, Y = [m]
be the output domain, where m is the number of classes. Let (xi, yi) be the i-th instance
in the original training set, where xi ∈ X is the input and yi ∈ Y is the corresponding true
label. The encryption process is to change every pair (x, y) to the encrypted pair (xenc, y)
where xenc ∈ X . In this paper, we consider the case that xenc is close to x in terms of `2
distance.
The learning system aims to learn a classifier f : X → Y using the encrypted training
set, which predicts label y given input xenc. We hope that the training will “fail”: after
training, f has high classification accuracy on the encrypted data, but low classification
accuracy on the original data. This means the training was successful on the encrypted
data, but it cannot be used for natural data.
2.1 Robust and Non-robust Features
In order to explain adversarial examples, people have proposed the notion of robust and
non-robust features (Ilyas et al., 2019). There are no formal definitions, but intuitively,
each data point x may contain both “robust” and “non-robust” features. Robust features
correspond to patterns that are predictive of the true label even when x is adversarially
perturbed under some pre-defined perturbation set, e.g. the `2 ball. Conversely, non-robust
features correspond to patterns that are also predictive, but can be easily “flipped” by
adversarial perturbations.
Humans can only perceive robust features, so after adversarial perturbations, we can
hardly see the changes in the data. However, ML models will use both types of features
to minimize the loss during the training, therefore flipping non-robust features will have a
huge impact on their prediction accuracy.
3. Basic Encryption
In this section, we introduce the basic encryption method based on adversarial attack. We
will first present the specific steps of our encryption method and explain the underlying
principle. Afterward, we run simulations on CIFAR-10 to validate our method, and also
show one potential weakness of the basic encryption method.
3.1 Basic Encryption Method
We first define a permutation P : [m] → [m] for all the m classes, and we call P a class
correspondence. For a given class y, P decides the target class P (y) so that the inputs
belong to class y will be perturbed with non-robust features of class P (y).
We also need to train a base classifier fθ on the original training set, where f can be
any modern neural network structure (e.g. ResNet or DenseNet). Given any input-label
pair (x, y) in the original training set, we compute the encrypted input xenc as follows.
xenc = arg min
‖x′−x‖≤ε
L(fθ(x′), P (y)) (1)
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where L is the loss function defined for the prediction fθ(x′) and target label P (y), and
ε is a small constant. We solve this optimization problem using projected gradient descent
(PGD) (Madry et al., 2017). Because ‖xenc − x‖ is small, the resulting encrypted inputs
xenc looks almost the same as the original input x.
All the encrypted input-label pairs (xenc, y) make up the new encrypted training set.
The overall encryption process is similar to the normal adversarial attack, except that we
pick a fixed target class for each source class, and the attack is made for the training set
instead of the test set. As we will see in Section 3.3, using a fixed target class is necessary
in our setting.
3.2 Underlying Intuition
When applying the encryption, we change the non-robust features of the data. All the inputs
in the encrypted training set exhibit non-robust features correlated with target class P (y),
but robust features correlated with source class y. For example, for every image containing
a dog, we may modify its non-robust feature to be cat. Hence, during the training, robust
dog features and non-robust cat features always come together and are labeled as “dog”.
Similarly, robust bird features and non-robust dog features always come together and are
labeled as “bird”. The classifier will easily learn this pattern. However, when a natural dog
image comes, it has both robust dog features and non-robust dog features. The classifier
will get confused because robust dog features are correlated with the label “dog”, but non-
robust dog features are correlated with the label “bird”. Two guidelines confuse the model
and cause it to make incorrect predictions. A conceptual description of the encryption
principle can be found in Figure 2.
3.3 Simulation of Basic Technique
We have run simulations based on CIFAR-10 dataset, which contains 10 classes. Our base
classifier fθ is a ResNet-50, and its classification accuracy on the original test set is 94.76%.
We then randomly generate a class correspondence function for the source class. The
correspondence P we use is: 0 → 8, 1 → 3, 2 → 1, 3 → 0, 4 → 2, 5 → 4, 6 → 9, 7 → 6, 8 →
7, 9→ 5 .
During the encryption process, our perturbations are constrained in `2-norm while each
PGD step is normalized to a fixed step size. We only add small perturbation, the , step
size and iterations are set as 0.5, 0.1, 100 respectively.
In Table 1, we report the performance of three different models (all models are imple-
mented in PyTorch and used in Li, 2019) in four different settings: Enc, Orig, Orig+P,
R+Orig. In all settings, the models are trained using the encrypted training set, but in
the first three settings, the training set is encrypted using our fixed class correspondence
(fixed class correspondence is a key step in the basic encryption method), while in R+Orig,
we encrypt each data point by picking random class targets. The test data set in Enc is
encrypted using our class correspondence function, and for other three settings, we use the
original test set. On top of that, in Orig+P, we add a post-processing step, where the
output of the model is P (fθ(x)) for the input x and classifier fθ.
From the first two columns of the Table 1 (Enc and Orig), we can see that our encrypted
dataset has achieved its purpose: the model has high accuracy on the encrypted test set
5
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Model Enc Orig Orig+P R+Orig
DenseNet-100bc (Huang et al., 2019) 94.70% 22.61% 32.00% 94.26%
PreResNet-110 (He et al., 2016) 94.64% 20.67% 41.95% 93.26%
VGG-19 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014) 93.58% 28.77% 34.43% 92.17%
Table 1: Classification accuracies of different models on the CIFAR-10 encrypted test set
and original test set.
Class Proportion
0 9.4%
1 0.3%
2 0.2%
3 36.8%
4 30.6%
5 0.9%
6 0.3%
7 0.2%
8 21.2%
9 0.1%
Table 2: The prediction distribution for images in class 0.
(the accuracy is similar to the results obtained by training on the original training set and
predicting on the original test set), and has extremely low accuracy on the original test
set. We remark that the high accuracy on the encrypted test set does not mean that the
model will be useful if one knows how to encrypt the data. This is because when creating
an encrypted data set, we need the extra information of the correct label of each input,
and then apply the correspondence function P to perturb the input. In practice, without
knowing the true label, one cannot encrypt the data even with the corresponding function
P . In other words, the accuracies for Enc is vacuous in practice, and we include it here to
serve as a strong benchmark for comparison.
If the model relies more on robust features, the accuracies in Orig (second column in
Table 1) should not be extremely low. If the model relies more on non-robust features, the
accuracies in Orig+P (third column in Table 1) should be much higher than Orig. However,
we see accuracies in Orig are very low, and accuracies in Orig+P are slightly higher than
Orig. This shows that the trained model gets confused when seeing the original images (as
we explained in Section 3.2), so it may make predictions different from y or P (y). Indeed,
as we show in Table 2, the prediction distribution of the trained model for images in class
0 is not well concentrated in class 0 or class 8 (the target class of 0 is 8).
Moreover, the accuracies in R+Orig show that using fixed target class is very necessary,
otherwise the trained model will have equally good accuracy as the normal case, which
means the encryption fails.
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Test set Test set acc
0→ 0 (orig test set) 22.61%
0→ 1 22.15%
0→ 2 22.10%
0→ 3 22.11%
0→ 4 22.21%
0→ 5 22.17%
0→ 6 22.24%
0→ 7 22.22%
0→ 8 31.49%
0→ 9 22.30%
Table 3: We simulate the attack process. Suppose we use the correspondence P defined in
Section 3.3 (i.e. 0 → 8). Assume the attack has a PreResNet-20 trained on the
CIFAR-10 encrypted training set as classifier M1, and has a ResNet-50 trained on
CIFAR-10 original training set as classifier M2. The attacker fixes the target class
for classes 1-9, and enumerates the target class for class 0. This table shows the
10 accuracies he gets from M1, where 0→ 8 has the highest accuracy.
3.4 Recovery of Correspondence Function P
As we mentioned before, decrypting the encrypted data is as hard as solving the adversarial
example problem. Instead of directly decrypting the data and cracking our method, in
this subsection we consider a simpler problem of recovering the correspondence function P .
According to Table 1, with the recovery of P the attacker can only slightly increase the
accuracy, but in practice that is also the extra hidden information that we do not want to
share.
Assume that there exists an attacker who knows our encryption method, and also has
the encrypted data set D (e.g., the CIFAR-10 dataset we used in the previous subsection).
He may also have some different labeled data D′ sampled from the original data distribution,
obtained from other sources.
He can learn the secret class correspondence function as follows. First, he trains a
classifier M1 on D and a classifier M2 on D
′. Then he uses M2 to simulate our encryption
process, that is, based on a correspondence function P , he modifies the the data points in
D′ to have incorrect non-robust features according to P . After encrypting D′, he uses M1
to make predictions on it. Usually, we assume P is a permutation, but here we relax this
requirement and allow the target class to appear in multiple locations. Now the attacker
can fix the target class for classes 1-9, and enumerate the target class for class 0. For
each possible correspondence P , he evaluates the performance of M1, and finally picks the
one with the highest accuracy for class 0, which will be the actual target class in P (see
Table 3). After processing the images of classes 1-9 in this way, the attacker can get the
correct correspondence within 100 attempts.
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Figure 3: Combined encryption method with different filters. The first row shows the Hori-
zontal Concat method: the left 50% of image 1 is horizontally concatenated with
the 50% of image 2. The second row shows the Mixup method: creates a new
encrypted image by interpolating between two images, using a constant alpha
0.50.
4. Combined Encryption
For the basic encryption method, the correspondence function is easy to recover, because if
each class of data only corresponds to one specific class, the number of correspondences is
limited. In this section, we present the combined encryption method, which addresses this
problem. Therefore, it is not only hard to decrypt the data, but also hard to recover the
specific encryption method.
4.1 Combined Encryption Method
For the combined encryption methods, each class y corresponds to multiple target classes
(i.e. we select multiple target classes {tyi }N(y)i=1 , N(y) ≥ 2). Then we modify each input-
label pair (x, y) from the original training set as follows. For each target class tyi , construct
encrypted input xi using the basic encryption method described above. Then, we combine
all the encrypted input {xi}N(y)i=1 into a new encrypted input x˜. Formally:
x˜ = T
(
{xi}N(y)i=1
)
N(y) ≥ 2 (2)
where T is a function that maps multiple inputs into a single new encrypted input, and
at the same time keeps ‖x˜− x‖ small. In other words, humans can hardly notice the
difference between x˜ and x. For example, T may be a function that concatenates two
examples horizontally, or generates a mixing coefficient and produces the new example as
a convex combination (similar to Mixup Zhang et al., 2017). See Figure 3 for illustration.
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class 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
target1 8 3 1 0 2 4 9 6 7 5
target2 4 2 3 5 7 1 8 0 6 9
Table 4: Encrypt correspondence used in Horizontal Concat.
Test set Test set acc
orig test set 31.70%
50%left + 50%right(encrypted) 94.44%
40%left + 60%right 94.10%
30%left + 70%right 92.26%
20%left + 80%right 90.28%
10%left + 90%right 85.96%
100%right 82.79%
Table 5: Classification accuracies obtain by changing the composition ratio of two target
images
The search space of our combined encryption method is exponentially larger than the
basic encryption method. First, each class of data corresponds to multiple classes (the
number N(y) can vary for different classes), which greatly increases the number of class
correspondences. Secondly, there are many different valid T functions for combining data.
For example, various data augmentation methods such as Mixup (Zhang et al., 2017),
CutMix (Yun et al., 2019), and Random square (Summers and Dinneen, 2019) can be
adapted as methods to combine multiple inputs into new encrypted inputs. As a result, it
is very difficult for an attacker to recover the encryption method (see detailed explanation
in Section 4.3).
4.2 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we demonstrate two combined encryption methods on CIFAR-10 dataset:
1) Horizontal Concat; 2) Mixup And Concat.
4.2.1 Horizontal Concat
We select two target classes for each source class (as shown in Table 4), then use PGD to
add adversarial perturbations to the image based on its two targets. For each image, we
get two sightly changed images. The left 50% of Image 1 is horizontally concatenated with
the 50% of Image 2. In practice, we may pick other composition ratios for each source
class, e.g., 80% and 20%. As a result, each image contains non-robust features of two target
classes.
One benefit of this method is that the ratio between the two images is unknown to the
attacker (not necessarily 50%-50%), so it provides protection for the encryption process.
As described in Section 3.4, if the attacker wants to recover the correspondence function,
he needs to know not only which classes each type of image corresponds to, but also how
9
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class 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
target1 8 3 1 0 2 4 9 6 7 5
target2 4 2 3 5 7 1 8 0 6 9
target2 6 2 9 1 0 7 5 3 4 8
target2 3 9 6 1 5 8 4 7 0 2
Table 6: Encrypt correspondence used in Horizontal Mixup And Concat.
Model Enc Orig Enc Orig
DenseNet-100bc 94.62% 29.69% 94.45% 32.92%
PreResNet-110 94.49% 32.65% 94.03% 37.21%
VGG-19 94.30% 48.13% 93.06% 55.00%
Table 7: Classification accuracies of different models on the CIFAR-10 encrypted test set
and original test set when using Horizontal Concat and Mixup And Concat. The
first and second columns correspond to Horizontal Concat, the third and fourth
columns correspond to Mixup And Concat.
the two pictures are concatenated together. Table 5 shows the accuracy obtained by using
the correct target class set but different composition ratio, set fixed for all source classes
(this is a simplification, because empirically one may need to pick different composition
ratio for different source classes). Hence, it is no longer easy for the attacker to pick the
correct correspondence class set by only looking at the relationship between accuracy and
correspondence class, because the composition ratio has a great impact on the final accuracy.
4.2.2 Mixup And Concat
Mixup And Concat is a more complicated combination method, where each class of image
corresponds to four classes, as shown in the Table 6. Similar to the previous method, for
each image we first get four new target images. Then we mixup Image 1 and Image 2 to
get Image 5 (e.g. Image 5 = 0.4 ∗ Image 1 + 0.6 ∗ Image 2), mixup Image 3 and Image 4 to
get Image 6 (e.g. Image 6 = 0.6 ∗ Image 3 + 0.4 ∗ Image 4). Finally, the left 50% of Image
5 is horizontally concatenated with the right 50% of Image 6.
Compared with Horizontal Concat, this approach is more secure. If the attacker does
not know the encryption correspondence in advance, it is difficult for him to figure out the
encryption method, as we will see in the next section. Table 7 shows that both Horizontal
Concat and Mixup And Concat methods work well, in the sense that after encryption, the
data can no longer be used for ML training.
4.3 Recovery of the Encryption Method
To show it is difficult to recover the encryption method, we start with Horizontal Concat,
where each source class corresponds to two other classes, and the encrypt correspondence
is defined in Table 4. As in Section 3.4, we assume that the attacker has the encrypted
10
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Test set Test set acc
orig test set 33.29%
(8,4) 41.31%
(4,8) 41.28%
(8,6) 40.37%
(8,5) 40.76%
(8,3) 39.82%
(1,4) 33.06%
(2,4) 38.53%
(3,4) 36.50%
(9,8) 34.81%
(7,8) 39.83%
(4,2) 38.16%
(4,3) 36.45%
(7,0) 32.85%
(5,0) 32.90%
(9,2) 33.51%
(0,3) 32.60%
(6,0) 32.52%
Table 8: Classification accuracies by adding two non-robust features to class 0 image
Test set Test set acc
mixup and concat(encrypted) 93.85%
orig test set 48.14%
target1 81.53%
target1+target2(horiz concat) 82.50%
Table 9: Classification accuracy by guessing different number of targets
dataset and some labeled original data. To find out the encryption method, he first needs
to decide N(y) for each source class y, which is very difficult.
Assume he can set N(y) = 2 for all y, as we used in our encryption, and he needs
to figure out the specific correspondence function. For example, as in Section 3.4, we
may start with source class 0. It may correspond to one hundred combinations ( e.g.
0→ (6, 3), 0→ (4, 5), etc). Table 8 shows some combinations and their accuracy, assuming
the encryption uses 50% and 50% composition ratio. After trying all 100 combinations, the
attacker will find the two with the highest accuracy (0 → (4, 8), 0 → (8, 4)), which is the
correct correspondence. However, from classes 1-9, he has to repeat this process and tries
a total of 1, 000 times to find all the target classes. This overhead is quite large, and this
is just the case when Horizontal Concat is used. If each class image corresponds to more
classes, such as using Mixup and Concat, he cannot find the correspondence efficiently. See
Table 9, where if Mixup and Concat is used, even the attacker knows the exact composition
ratio and correspondence function, he can only get 82.50% test accuracy compared with
93.85% if he knows the exact encryption method. Moreover, 82.50% is fairly close to the
11
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Method orig train set→new test set enc train set→orig test set
source only 83.80% 28.73%
GTA 89.28% 49.72%
Table 10: Classification accuracies of GTA on original CIFAR-10 and encrypted CIFAR-10
accuracy of 81.53%, which is the accuracy one can get if he knows one of the target classes
used in Mixup and Concat.
In addition, the various hyperparameters in the encryption process (the value of , step
size, iteration), how multiple images are combined (Mixup, Concat, or CutMix) are also
unknown to the attacker. All these factors show that it is hard for the attacker to even
recover the encryption method.
4.4 Domain Adaptation
Although the encrypted data cannot be used for training, maybe it can still provide some
other extra information about the data distribution because the encrypted data look similar
to the original data. However, in this subsection, we demonstrate that the encrypted data
are from a distribution different from the natural data distribution, by applying techniques
from domain adaptation.
The rationale is the following. If the two datasets are close to each other, then training
on the first one and testing on the second one will give us good accuracy. However, if the
two datasets are far away from each other, the training on the first one and testing on the
second one will give us bad accuracy. In the latter case, we may use domain adaptation
methods to improve the test accuracy.
In Table 10, we use Generate To Adapt (GTA) described in Sankaranarayanan et al.
(2018) to illustrate the idea. To form a comparative experiment, we test the effect of using
GTA on original training set and new CIFAR-10 test set (as described in Recht et al. (2018),
there exists a small distribution shift between the original CIFAR-10 dataset and the new
test set). From Table 10, we observe that GTA method improves the accuracy of new
test set from 83.80% to 89.28%. This proves that GTA can solve the general domain shift
problems. But it can only help the attacker improve the accuracy of the original test set
from 28.73% to 49.72%. This shows that GTA has little effect on our encrypted dataset.
In other words, the encrypted data distribution and the original data distribution are far
away from each other. Attempts to crack our encryption methods are much more complex
and difficult to solve than the general domain shift problem.
5. Real World Experiments on Medical Data
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) provides excellent soft tissue contrast of brain tumors
without exposing the patient to radiations, consequently it is widely used in the clinical
diagnosis of brain tumors. We collaborate with a world-leading neurological center and use
their preprocessed, isotropic interpolated brain MRIs as experiment data. For each MRI,
we choose the cross-section with the largest tumor size and form a 2D image dataset. The
12
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Figure 4: Brain MRIs from the original test set (top row) and corresponding images from
the encrypted test set (bottom row). For each original image, the tumor is marked
out using red bounding box.
Class Number in training set Number in test set
Meningioma 879 219
Chordoma 1149 287
Schwannoma 541 135
Pituitary Adenoma 1451 362
Craniopharyngioma 233 58
Total 4253 1061
Table 11: Number of each class of brain tumor MRI in the dataset.
dataset consists of 5, 314 MRIs (320×320 pixels each) in 5 classes, and the number of images
in each class is not the same. 20% of images from each class is selected as the test set, and
the remaining images are used as the training set (As shown in Table 11).
Architecture Enc test set Orig test set
DenseNet-100bc 79.01% 38.84%
PreResNet-110 79.92% 33.14%
PreResNet-20 78.10% 43.64%
VGG-19 80.01% 48.84%
VGG-11 79.98% 50.15%
Table 12: Classification accuracies of different models on the brain tumor MRI encrypted
test set and original test set.
We use the Horizontal Concat encryption technique. The base classifier is ResNet-18
(since the dataset is not huge, we choose a smaller model to avoid overfitting), and its
13
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Figure 5: Doctor’s evaluation process for original MRIs and encrypted MRIs
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Figure 6: Results of doctors’ diagnoses on the original test set and the encrypted test set.
classification accuracy on the original test set is 79.92%. The correspondence P we used is:
0 → (1, 3), 1 → (2, 4), 2 → (3, 0), 3 → (4, 1), 4 → (0, 2). The adversarial perturbations are
constrained in `2-norm. Hyperparameter , step size and iterations are set as 2, 0.1, 100
respectively. The experimental process is similar to that in Section 3.3. After construct-
ing the encrypted dataset using the Horizontal Concat encryption encryption method, we
train different models on the encrypted training set and observe their performances on the
encrypted test set and the original test set.
Results are shown in Table 12. We can see that all the models trained on the encrypted
training set have extremely low accuracies on the original test set. We also sample some
images from the original and encrypted brain image test sets and display them in Figure 4.
We invite 3 doctors from Beijing Tiantan Hospital, who are experts on brain MRIs,
to evaluate the difference between the original and encrypted brain image test sets. The
entire evaluation process can be seen Figure 5. Firstly, images in the original test set and
the encrypted test set are shuffled randomly. Then, doctors examine and make a diagnosis
based on each image in the original test set. Thereafter, doctors examine and make a
diagnosis based on each image in the encrypted test set.
In the end, diagnoses of each patient from the two test sets are compared, and the
results are summarised in Figure 6. In 95% cases, doctors make the same diagnoses for
both original and encrypted images, with 72% cases being correct diagnoses and 23% being
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wrong diagnoses (this is similar to other brain MRI . In the remaining 5% cases, doctors
make different diagnoses, with 2% being correct on the original image and wrong on the
encrypted image, and 3% being wrong on the original image and correct on the encrypted
image. These results indicate that encryption does not affect the doctors’ diagnosis of brain
tumors.
Overall, we think our encryption method works well on real medical data and achieves
its goal: for humans the encrypted data and original data can both be used for diagnosis,
but for machine learning models the encrypted data are useless in training.
6. Related Work
Researchers have been studying the data sharing problem for a long time. For example,
multi-party computation (Yao, 1982, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987; Chaum et al., 1988; Ben-
Or et al., 1988; Bogetoft et al., 2009) considers the setting that multiple parties jointly
compute a function, without the need of revealing each other’s private inputs. As another
example, differential privacy (Dwork and Nissim, 2004; Blum et al., 2005; Dwork et al., 2006;
Dwork, 2008; Abadi et al., 2016) considers the mechanism design problem for database
privacy, where adding or removing any single element in the database will only slightly
change the outcome for the query to the database.
Adversarial example is an active research area in deep learning. There have been many
attack strategies to fool the neural networks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Madry et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner,
2017). On the other side, researchers have tried to propose defense mechanisms against
such attacks to train robust networks (Gu and Rigazio, 2014; Madry et al., 2017; Zheng
et al., 2016; Samangouei et al., 2018b; Schott et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Lee et al.,
2019). There are also many papers proposing models to explain adversarial examples (Ilyas
et al., 2019; Gilmer et al., 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018; Ford et al., 2019; Tanay and Griffin,
2016; Shafahi et al., 2019; Mahloujifar et al., 2018; Bubeck et al., 2018), among which Ilyas
et al. (2019) propose that adversarial perturbations arise as well-generalizing, yet brittle,
features (non-robust features).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new encryption method for the data-sharing problem, so that
the encrypted data can be used for human-centered activities, but not for machine learning
training purposes. Using the encrypted data, the data stealers cannot train a model that
generalizes to original natural data. Our method is based on adversarial attack and can
be divided into basic encryption method and combined encryption method. The basic
encryption method solves our data sharing problem, and the combined encryption method
further improves its security. We present a series of simulations on CIFAR-10 to validate
both methods. We also apply our combined encryption to the real-world clinical data and
find that our encryption does not affect the doctors’ diagnosis of brain tumors. Our method
heavily relies on the hardness of adversarial examples. Hence, for future work, it would be
interesting to understand the limitation of adversarial examples theoretically.
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